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Abstract: Objective: In this paper we theorize that partisanship is such a strong filter of 
information that it can affect how individuals make sense of their lived environment and how the 
geographic experience informs policy attitudes. As a result, although “independents” tend to be 
less politically knowledgeable and have less developed policy opinions, their policy attitudes on 
gun control are more informed by their lived experience than partisans. Methods: We use data 
from an original survey of American adults about crime and gun control linked to crime statistics 
from the FBI.  Results: We find that stronger partisanship leads to resistance to information from 
the lived environment in the development of policy attitudes about gun control. Conclusion: 
Democrats and Republicans have very different views about guns and, generally, these priorities 
are relatively unaffected by contextual experience; however, gun policy attitudes of 
independents, are highly correlated with the level of gun crime in their geographic context.    
                                                          
1 Authors names are listed in random order; contributions are equal. This paper was previously 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 
CA, September 3-6, 2015.  We greatly appreciate the feedback provided by the discussant, 
Heather Ondercin and several audience and panel members. We also would like to thank 
Makayle Washington for her research assistance on an earlier version of this project and 
Alexandra Filindra for helpful feedback. 
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The context-cue interaction approach examines how partisanship interacts with social 
context to influence policy beliefs (Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013; Pearson-Merkowitz, 
Filindra and Dyck, 2015).  Partisanship, the theory argues, can interrupt the connection between 
the geographic, cultural, and social environment and the development of public policy attitudes. 
The theory attempts to explain why the connection between the information that people gather 
via their lived environment and social interactions does not always translate into policy opinions 
that political scientists and social psychologists would expect.  While the psychological literature 
suggests that intimate experience with minorities should increase tolerance and acceptance of 
that minority group via intergroup contact, the context-cue interaction builds on the original 
premise of this argument and its limitations (e.g. Allport 1979) and suggests that, at least in 
relation to policies that benefit minorities, this connection is limited.  Partisanship creates a 
perceptual screen that mitigates the social experience from affecting policy opinions. 
In this paper, we build on this basic approach to examine how partisanship affects the 
link between policy beliefs and other kinds of social context.  We examine how the actual 
context of where one lives affects policy attitudes in the area of gun control.  We propose that 
one’s immediate social environment will not affect policy attitudes and policy prioritization if 
the individual is strongly attached to a political party. Specifically, we argue that geographic 
context will be less consequential to attitudes and perceptions of partisans because party 
identification provides such strong cues about how to think about policies such that the 
immediate lived environment becomes a secondary, instead of a primary, influence. Our findings 
suggest that independents are the only group whose policy concerns track their lived experience 
in regard to crime and guns. Partisans, on the other hand, hold largely stable policy views on gun 
control and gun violence whether they live in a high crime or low crime area.  
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Putting Context in Context 
In the tradition of Key (1949) and Berelson, Lazersfeld, and McPhee (1954), scholars 
have long posited that social placement and where someone lives is the primary influence on 
political beliefs and opinion formation. Social placement includes a person’s social surroundings, 
including their network of friends, family, co-workers, and fellow church goers as well as the 
context of their environment including who else lives in their immediate surroundings and the 
economic and political position of their context. In the geography literature, this is often referred 
to as Tobler’s first law of geography – that “everything is related to everything, but near things 
are more related than distant things.” (Tobler, 1970).   
The psychological mechanism of contextual theories is well established: Environmental 
cues change how people perceive the importance of issues or how to solve problems (e.g. 
Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). The term “contextual effects” is meant to describe the process 
through which interpersonal interactions, observations, and experiences affect the political 
beliefs and voting choices of the people living within a geographic space. The contextual effects 
literature is often focused on the connection between exposure to or interaction with minority 
groups and attitudes toward minorities (e.g. see Riek et al, 2006 for a recent review of this 
literature). However, context is also known to affect other areas of political life such as views on 
the environment (e.g. Blake, 2001; Egan and Mullin 2012) and the death penalty (e.g. Soss et al., 
2003). And some explicitly geographic examinations have demonstrated that proximity to rail 
lines (Petersen et al. 2008), the US/Mexico border (Branton and Dunaway, 2009), or polling 
places (Dyck and Gimpel, 2005) affects both policy attitudes and political behavior. 
Neighborhood context has also been shown to act as a mobilizing or demobilizing effect in 
studies of political participation (e.g. McClurg, 2003; Pearson-Merkowitz, 2012; Enos 2016). 
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While some contextual effects theories have come under fire due to the causal inference problem 
(e.g. Oakes 2004), recent research has found that assumptions from the context-cue interaction 
approach about the “treatment” people receive in their contextual environment is indeed well-
grounded in reality (Newman et al. 2015).  
Context, Crime, and Partisanship 
The effect of context on attitudes and views on crime should be rather straightforward. 
For example, Soss et al. (2003) use the murder rate in the county in which a respondent resides to 
predict support for the death penalty. Their logic is fairly straight forward: “A higher murder rate 
implies a greater chance that an individual will know someone (or know someone who knows 
someone) who has been murdered. It also may produce a greater stream of interpersonal and 
mediated communication regarding crime and punishment” (Soss et al., 2003, 406). As the 
likelihood of being a victim increases and concern that one might be a victim increases, so too 
should “perceptions that there is a real need for the death penalty” (Soss et al., 2003, 406). In this 
way the context in which one lives should influence how individuals perceive the need for 
different policies.  
The contextual effects literature would suggest that those who experience high rates of 
crime in their neighborhood would think crime was an important political issue (e.g. Graber, 
1980).  However, the partisanship literature suggests that people’s political priorities and policy 
views are not shaped by their lived experience as much as their political preferences and the 
views that they are exposed via trusted political elites (e.g. Zaller 1992).  
 Mutz (1994) for example, posits that impersonal influences can affect public opinion. 
The media is perhaps the most pervasive of these “impersonal influences” as most Americans are 
bombarded by a steady stream of media information. Mutz and Soss (1997; 452) argue that the 
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media can serve as a “surrogate for more direct expressions or solicitations of public opinion.” 
Attention to the media, then, is a shortcut that people may use to stay aware of the political 
environment outside of their own lived experience.  Specifically on issues of crime, the media is 
known to influence public attitudes about how to deal with perpetrators, as well as influencing 
people’s perceptions of the stereotypical criminal (e.g. Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000).   
In a similar vein, the elite-cue giving perspective (Lupia 1994; Popkin 1991; Zaller 1992) 
argues that elites offer important “information shortcuts” for those who identify with them, 
helping these adherents make sense of the numerous political issues of the day. As a result, with 
just small pieces of information, relatively inattentive partisan voters appear to make seemingly 
informed decisions and hold consistent policy opinions because they are able to make use of cues 
in the information environment (Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994).  Since most voters have some degree 
of ambivalence regarding public policies, they respond to the considerations offered by elites 
with whom they share a political identity (Zaller 1992).  Democrats and Republicans do not use 
or trust the same media sources and are increasingly suspicious of the fairness of news coverage 
on the “other” side (Mitchell et al. 2014). As a result, issues can become a priority to individuals 
and simple evaluations of the extant environment can be shaped more by which elites (including 
which media channels) one listens to, than the actual environment in which one lives.  
Groups that lack cues (i.e. political independents) may therefore be less likely to make 
“informed” decisions. In addition, pure independents are often marked by their lack of attention 
to politics and general political knowledge. Independents are less likely to be able to identify 
which policy positions “go with” which political party and hold less stable or coherent ideologies 
(Zaller 1992). But political knowledge is not entirely necessary to gain perception of basic 
experiential realities, particularly about issues like crime and safety which are highly related to 
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one’s neighborhood context (Beckett 1994).2 Partisans might have knowledge about a policy 
issue, but their information environment acts to dissuade them from contextualizing new 
information in a way that challenges their political predispositions due to agenda-setting by 
political elites (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Reinarman and Levine, 1989; Christiansen, 2013).  
However, in regard to policies that are “localized,” we argue independents are better able 
to prioritize policy concerns based on ground-level information and make instrumental 
connections because of, not despite, their lack of partisan identification and general political 
awareness. Thus, we argue that the connection between cues in the contextual environment and 
policy positions is not as “clean” as it might be. Instead, all information, including that from the 
lived environment is filtered through a partisan lens. Specifically, we posit that, the 
environmental context in which we live should affect our perceptions of policy attitudes and 
what is important and politically relevant.  However, partisanship will decrease the relevance of 
apolitical cues, lived experience and objective reality. Interestingly, the logic of our theory is that 
it is those with weaker partisan attachments or no attachments at all (independents) who should 
respond most to their environment and therefore, logically prioritize policy arenas that will 
directly benefit them.   
Republican and Democratic elites have taken different stands on the importance of guns 
and violent crime in recent history (Gimpel 1998). Democrats have embraced gun control and 
crime reduction, and particularly stopping gun crime, as a “major issue.” In his campaign and 
                                                          
2 In regards to our hypothesis in specific, Beckett (1994) tracks concern about crime between 
1964 and 1992 and finds that concern over crime tracked elite attention to crime more than any 
actual incidence in crime.  
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subsequent presidency, Barack Obama focused extensively on the need for more police, gun 
control, and more attention and money focused at decreasing gun violence (Koren 2016). He 
pushed for Congress to take up gun control and talked extensively about the impact of gun crime 
in specific on the nation’s families. In his 2013 State of the Union address, over four dozen 
victimized families of gun violence were in attendance and the President used the opportunity to 
make a plea to congress to pass greater restrictions on guns.3 Republicans tend to emphasize gun 
rights and even to argue that a greater presence of guns empowers ordinary citizens and will lead 
to a decrease crime. The “tea party” movement within the Republican Party has made gun rights 
one of its primary agenda items and has used an empowerment argument to attract women to the 
party by noting that gun rights are a feminist principal (Deckman 2016).  
Both parties discuss gun control extensively in the national party platforms. For 
Democrats the party platform has called for a new assault weapons ban and other gun regulations 
to decrease gun violence for decades. The Republican platform has focused on gun ownership of 
all types being a fundamental right that cannot be infringed upon by the federal government. 
These positions are visible in debates and votes on gun control in Congress as well. A day after 
the San Bernardino shootings in which a couple engaged in a mass shooting, the U.S Senate took 
up the Manchin-Toomey Amendment which would have expanded background checks on for 
purchasers of firearms. The measure failed on a vote of 48-50 with only two Republicans 
(Senators Pat Toomey-PA and Susan Collins-ME) voting in favor of the Amendment and one 
Democrat (Senator Heidi Heitkamp-ND) voting against. Other recent gun control votes in 
                                                          
3 http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/obama-makes-plea-gun-control-state-
union/story?id=18481837 
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Congress and public statements about gun control mirror this divide—Republicans favor of 
expanding gun ownership for the sake of “protection” and Democrats favor of gun control for the 
sake of “protection.” For those who are politically knowledgeable and follow politics even 
remotely, gun control has become an “easy issue” (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Lindaman and 
Haider-Markel 2002).  
Given the clear priorities and positions of the two parties, we believe strong Republicans 
are likely to think that a) crime is a major issue but b) that gun control is not the answer to 
lowering violent crime. Strong Democrats, on the other hand, are likely to think that a) crime is a 
major issue and b) gun control is an answer to lowering violent crime.  For these strong 
partisans, we believe that we will find that these two beliefs are unaffected by the context in 
which the respondent lives because their priorities and subsequent policy beliefs are likely to 
have been set by the partisan information environment and not their local lived context.  
True independents, on the other hand, are free from partisan elite cues. Not only are they 
less likely to pay attention to political messaging, they also are less likely to process their 
environment in terms of the current political agenda or policy solutions offered by party elites. 
Importantly, however, unlike many other policies, in the case of violent crime, independents 
need not pay attention to partisan politics or read a national newspaper to get a feel for how 
much crime exists in their neighborhood. This is information gained through local media, 
discussions with neighbors and other experiences that happen just being in one’s environment 
(police sirens, gun shots, local news, etc. (Weitzer and Kubrin 2004). Thus, we expect that pure 
independents’ attitudes about gun control, and views about crime/policy priorities will be most 
closely associated with objective measures of crime in the extant environment.  Stated more 
formally, we develop the following hypotheses:   
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H1:  Concern about crime and attitudes toward gun control will be influenced by the 
actual amount of crime in the lived environment.   
H2:  Concern about crime and attitudes toward gun control will be influenced by 
partisan identification. Strong Democrats will be the most likely to view crime as a major 
problem and to support gun control measures. Strong Republicans will be the least likely to view 
crime as a major problem and to oppose gun control measures. 
And H3: The effect of the local environment on concerns about crime and attitudes 
toward gun control should be strongest for independents and weakest for strong Democrats and 
strong Republicans.   
Research Design 
We test our hypotheses using data from an original 2014 survey conducted by YouGov in 
April of that year. To achieve a representative sample, 1,172 respondents were surveyed using a 
non-probability online sample; the data were trimmed to 1,000 using a propensity score matching 
algorithm to a frame constructed from benchmarks on age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of 
education, and ideology from the 2010 American Community Survey.  All analyses were then 
conducted using a post-matching weight variable.  This method of achieving representative 
samples has been used in numerous previous studies and has been tested extensively for external 
validity in elections (Vavreck and Rivers, 2008; Ansolabere and Rivers, 2013). 
To test the hypotheses we have outlined requires (1) a contextual level measure of actual 
crime and (2) variables asking for perceptions of crime as well as attitudes about firearm policy.  
Our measure of context is a county level measure of violent crime, with a per capita adjustment 
for the size of the population.  The data come from the FBI’s 2013 uniform crime reporting 
database.  There are some issues with this measure of context, to be sure.  First, we would prefer 
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to have a smaller contextual unit of analysis, as counties can be large, diverse and may contain 
different neighborhoods with varying degrees of crime and correlates of crime.4  Additionally, 
the uniform database relies on police agencies to self-report crimes; it would seem that in some 
areas there may be an incentive to creatively report crime to downplay its severity.  However, 
crime reports are considered valid indicators of crime (Gove et al. 1985), the database is used 
frequently in academic studies regarding crime, and, it is the geographically smallest and best 
indicator available of violent crime in the United States. Also, we see no strong a priori reason to 
believe that an imperfect measure of context introduces anything other than random error into 
our models.   
Our models of concerns about crime come from the following question: How concerned 
are you about the level of gun violence and gun-related crimes in the United States in the past 
few years?  (very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, not at all concerned).  
Our models of gun control attitudes come from the following question on banning assault 
weapons: Do you [strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose] 
banning the sale of assault weapons?  To test our central hypothesis, we ran ordered logit 
models on each of the two outcomes, interacting our county-level measure of neighborhood 
crime with a five-point scale of party ID.5  Control variables are included for gender, race (white 
                                                          
4 There is some research that suggests that crime should be considered at a more diffuse level of 
aggregation (Hipp 2007).  Because of this, county might be an acceptable, if not ideal, level of 
aggregation.  
5 In a five-point scale, leaning independents and weak partisans are collapsed into a single 
category because they are generally behaviorally indistinct.  We considered using the full seven-
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and non-white), age (and its square), education, political awareness (a 6 point scale constructed 
from 5 questions), ideology (5 point likert scale), urbanicity (NCHS subrural categories from the 
CDC) and a question regarding gun ownership which asks whether there are guns in the home 
that the individual lives in.  Full coding specifics are detailed in the supplemental appendix.   
Results 
The results of our complete analysis are presented in Table 1 and include both a baseline 
model and a model that includes the party ID interaction with the contextual variable. Since 
interactive effects and non-linear coefficients are both difficult to interpret without the use of 
visual aids, we present the effects graphically in Figures 1-2 (baseline effect) and Figures 3-4 
(interactions).  
[Table 1 about here] 
We begin by demonstrating evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.  For both perceptions of 
crime and the ban on assault weapons, there is strong evidence that living in an area with higher 
levels of violent crime per capita leads to an increased probability of being “very concerned” 
about the level of gun violence and gun crime in the United States, which we present in Figure 1.  
The effect is both statistically significant and substantively large – from a low crime to a high 
crime environment increases the probability of being very concerned about gun violence and 
gun-related crimes by 29 percentage points, while the likelihood of only being not very or not at 
all concerned decreases. A similar result is found shifting to the policy variable that asks if 
                                                          
point scale, but we are not assuming a linear effect and therefore measurement precision puts 
greater pressure on the model.  We have run the models with both a 3 point and 7-point scale and 
found similar substantive results.   
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survey respondents are in favor of a ban on assault weapons in Figure 2; a respondent is 20 
percentage points more likely to “strongly support” a ban on assault weapons if they live in a 
high crime environment than in a low crime environment while the likelihood of a respondent 
being somewhat or very opposed decreases as the crime rate increases. This effect is also 
statistically significant at p<.001.  Therefore, we find consistent evidence that the lived 
environment impacts the manner in which people prioritize crime and that more crime increases 
support for gun control policy.    
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
However, our theory posits that partisanship will act as a filter which will impede 
respondents from using their lived context to think about both policy attitudes and perceptions of 
crime.  We test this by modeling crime perceptions and support/opposition to a ban on assault 
weapons as a function of party identification, county-level violent crime per capita, and their 
interaction. 
The effects by party are presented in figures 3a and 3b for the dependent variable: 
perceptions of gun violence and crime.  On general concern about gun violence (figures 3a and 
3b), strong Republicans are not affected by the social environment.  Strong Democrats, to be 
sure, are, with a probability difference of .16 between the least violent and most violent context; 
in a county with no violence, the probability of being “very concerned” about gun violence is 
.64, while in the highest crime environment, that probability is .80.  The difference for 
Republicans is 11 points (.44 to .33), but that difference is not statistically significant.  However, 
the effect is substantially larger for independents.  Pure independents in the least violent context 
have a predicted probability of being “very concerned” about gun violence of .25, compared to 
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those in the most violent context who have a probability of .98, a 73 percentage point difference.  
The interaction effects for both Weak/Leaning Republicans and Democrats are not significant. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The effects of local gun violence on support for a ban on assault weapons are presented 
by party in figures 3c and 3d.  Notably, Democrats are more supportive of a ban on assault 
weapons than Republicans by large margins (Figure 3c).  However, for Strong Democrats, 
Strong Republicans and Weak/Leaning Republicans, opinions do not vary with crime context.  
The respondent in the county with the highest crime is not more likely to be in favor of a ban on 
all assault style weapons than if they live in an area with virtually no reported violent crime.  But 
this finding does not apply to pure independents or weak/leaning Democrats (Figure 3d).  For 
both groups, as violent crime in the county increases, so too does the probability of support the 
assault weapon ban.  These differences are substantively quite large.  A pure independent, for 
instance, who lives in a very low crime county has a predicted probability of strongly supporting 
the assault weapon ban of only .25; that probability increases to .69 in counties with the highest 
rates of crime-- an increase of 44 percentage points. 
Taken together, the findings provide strong support for our hypotheses.  While crime 
context affects opinions about whether or not gun crime is a serious problem and support or 
opposition towards gun control, there is tremendous variation in this effect by party, regardless 
of context.  Independents are the most consistently responsive group to the objective social 
environment on attitudes about crime.  They are more likely to connect violent crime in their 
neighborhood to perceptions about crime as well as attitudes towards banning assault weapons.  
Strong partisans have such crystalized attitudes that they do not appear to use or be moved by 
information from their social context in crafting attitudes about crime and gun control.     
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Discussion and Conclusion 
There are large partisan differences in attitudes towards both crime and gun control, 
consistent with previous research linking issue frames to partisan attitudes on the topic (Haider-
Markel and Joslyn 2001).  Our analysis shows that Democrats are very concerned about gun 
violence and strongly in favor of banning assault weapons.6  Likewise, strong Republicans are 
less concerned about violence and less supportive of banning assault weapons. While these 
findings should be expected given current debates over gun control, our findings demonstrate 
that strong partisans (as well as weak/leaning Democrats and Republicans) are not sensitive to 
actual violence in the lived environment. Strong partisans, and even relatively weak partisans, 
rarely alter their concern about crime or their support for gun control that would limit the 
availability of large ammunition guns, even in the face of violence in the lived environment. For 
the case of partisans, crime is either an issue (as it is for the majority of strong Democrats) or it is 
not (as is the case for a majority of strong Republicans).     
However, the story is different for independents. We theorized that given the lack of 
partisan cues on the topic, independents would be the most likely to actually use their lived 
experience to develop their attitudes toward gun violence and gun control. Our models suggest 
that it is indeed independents that are the most responsive to their lived environment in the 
development of their political concerns and policy attitudes.  
Our results extend conflict-cue interaction theory to the case of crime policy. Partisanship 
not only interrupts the connection between policy preferences and interpersonal contacts but also 
interrupts the connection between social placement and policy concerns and beliefs.   
                                                          
6 We note that an assault weapon ban is really only one part of the gun control debate and more research is needed 
before generalizing about overall policy effects.   
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In conclusion, there appears to be an important contextual influence of the lived or local 
experience on individuals when it comes to crime, but this influence is conditioned by party 
identification.  Political independents are oft maligned in political science literature as being 
distinguished by their lack of attention to news and coverage of politics and public affairs.  But 
on issues like crime and safety that cut so close to home, it is very interesting that independents 
appear to be the most affected by their lived context.  In this sense, media messaging and elite 
dissemination of cues appears to stop, filter and sort potentially relevant information from the 
environment.  If we put this into context with recent research on facts in politics, we find some 
evidence that the lens of party identification conditions the lived environment in such a way that 
even the nature of the facts are up for debate.   
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Figure 1 – Marginal Effect of Local Violent Crime Per Capita on Concern about Violent 
Crime 
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Figure 2 – Marginal Effect of Local Violent Crime Per Capita on Attitudes on Assault 
Weapon Ban 
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Figure 3. Marginal Effects for Gun Violence Concern and Assault Weapons Ban Models 
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Table 1 – Predicting Attitudes about Gun Violence Concern & A Proposed Policy on Ban Assault Weapons 
 Gun Violence Concern Assault Weapon Ban 
 Model 1-1 – Base Model  Model 1-2 – Interactions  Model 2-1 – Base Model  Model 2-2 – Interactions  
Variable Coef SE p< Coef SE p< Coef SE p< Coef SE p< 
Crime Per Capita (PC) 0.598 0.224 0.008 0.355 0.225 0.115 0.435 0.110 0.000 -0.009 0.212 0.966 
Weak/Leaning Dem -0.670 0.077 0.000 -0.574 0.120 0.000 -0.607 0.064 0.000 -0.978 0.108 0.000 
Independent/Unsure -0.943 0.127 0.000 -1.639 0.166 0.000 -1.321 0.089 0.000 -1.706 0.132 0.000 
Weak/Leaning Rep -1.301 0.118 0.000 -1.293 0.146 0.000 -1.501 0.108 0.000 -1.440 0.156 0.000 
Strong Republican -1.066 0.189 0.000 -0.895 0.297 0.003 -1.450 0.174 0.000 -1.566 0.379 0.000 
CrimePC X Weak Dem --- --- --- -0.249 0.243 0.306 --- --- --- 0.872 0.213 0.000 
CrimePC X Independent --- --- --- 1.837 0.508 0.000 --- --- --- 0.941 0.275 0.001 
Crime PC X Weak Rep --- --- --- -0.067 0.272 0.806 --- --- --- -0.282 0.314 0.369 
Crime PC X Strong Rep --- --- --- -0.558 0.443 0.208 --- --- --- 0.199 0.638 0.755 
Gender (0,1) 0.410 0.060 0.000 0.395 0.061 0.000 0.505 0.051 0.000 0.495 0.052 0.000 
Non-white (0,1) 0.384 0.050 0.000 0.372 0.055 0.000 -0.001 0.053 0.982 -0.016 0.059 0.790 
Age -0.029 0.009 0.002 -0.026 0.009 0.003 -0.057 0.012 0.000 -0.055 0.011 0.000 
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Education -0.009 0.028 0.752 -0.002 0.027 0.949 0.048 0.027 0.079 0.051 0.029 0.080 
Political Awareness 0.018 0.031 0.558 0.019 0.033 0.570 -0.059 0.038 0.122 -0.061 0.038 0.106 
Liberal (0,1) 0.006 0.130 0.965 0.047 0.138 0.735 -0.041 0.112 0.717 -0.048 0.110 0.660 
Moderate/Unsure (0,1) -0.056 0.133 0.673 -0.012 0.147 0.936 -0.578 0.136 0.000 -0.567 0.136 0.000 
Conservative (0,1) -0.425 0.183 0.020 -0.411 0.190 0.031 -1.383 0.164 0.000 -1.379 0.156 0.000 
Very Conservative (0,1) -0.269 0.218 0.216 -0.261 0.217 0.229 -1.934 0.154 0.000 -1.942 0.149 0.000 
Urbanicity -0.027 0.065 0.679 -0.018 0.066 0.784 -0.070 0.025 0.005 -0.071 0.023 0.002 
Gun in HH, not owner (0,1) 0.109 0.191 0.569 0.159 0.180 0.377 0.912 0.131 0.000 0.929 0.113 0.000 
No Guns in HH (0,1) 0.844 0.157 0.000 0.805 0.160 0.000 1.263 0.099 0.000 1.253 0.097 0.000 
Cut 1 -3.590 0.279  -3.600 0.305  -2.849 0.304  -3.010 0.287  
Cut 2 -2.024 0.237  -2.032 0.268  -1.575 0.292  -1.734 0.273  
Cut 3 0.109 0.214  0.116 0.246  -0.505 0.299  -0.661 0.278  
N 897   897   895   895   
Pseudo R2 .089   .093   .152   .153   
Note: Model coefficients are from ordered logit regression; variable coding in Appendix Table A1; data are from a 2014 UMass Lowell Center for Public Opinion 
Poll of 1000 American Adults; conducted by YouGov for the authors. 
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Supplemental Appendix Table A1 – Variable Coding 
Independent Variables Coding 
Crime Per Capita (instances of violent crime/population) * 100 
Party ID 
Dummy variables for Weak/Leaning Dem, Independent/Unsure, Weak/Leaning 
Rep, Strong Republican (Strong Democrat is excluded category) 
Gender (0,1) Dummy variable for respondent gender 
Non-white (0,1) Dummy variable for if respondent is non-white 
Age Age, in years 
Age2 The square of age 
Education 6 point Likert scale ranges from No HS degree to Post-grad degree 
Political Awareness 
Index of 5 knowledge items: id of John Boehner, John Roberts and David Cameron; 
which party controls the House and Senate?   
Ideology 
Dummy variables for Liberal, Moderate/Unsure, Conservative, Very Conservative 
(Very Liberal is the excluded category) 
Urbanicity 4-point scale ranges from large metro, suburb, small metro, non-metro 
Gun Ownership 
Dummy variables for “gun in household, not the owner,” and “no gun in 
household”; “gun owner” is the excluded category  
  
Dependent Variables  
Table 1 – Concern about 
Gun Violence and Crime 
How concerned are you about the level of gun violence and gun-related crimes in 
the United States in the past few years?  Choose the option that best suits your 
view. 
47%       Very concerned (4) 
37%       Somewhat concerned (3) 
13%       Not very concerned (2)  
4%         Not at all concerned (1) 
Table 2 – Support for 
Assault Weapon Ban 
Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly 
banning the sale of assault weapons?   
40% Strongly support (4) 
20%        Somewhat support (3) 
20%        Somewhat oppose (2) 
20%        Strongly oppose (1) 
 
 
